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The visit of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, the Premier of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), to the United States of America was depicted by the 
Soviet press as ‘the thirteen days that stirred the world’, a ‘mission of good hope’ that 
had ‘no precedent in history’.i Similarly, the American media frequently referred to it 
as representing a ‘peace effort’,ii a source of new hope. To be sure, Premier 
Khrushchev’s trip to the USA, which began on 15 September and ended on 27 
September 1959, was a significant affair. Not only was the visit the first by a Soviet 
leader, but it occurred at a time when relations between the USSR and the US were 
under intense strain. Indeed, Khrushchev’s visit to the United States, advertised under 
the banner of ‘peace and friendship’,iii was widely regarded as a historic venture that 
had the potential to mitigate the climate of fear that the Cold War had created. 
Considering the visit in greater detail, Khrushchev’s trip to America can be 
interpreted as a promising step toward easing world tensions as it fostered 
expectations of improving the hostile US-Soviet relationship. 
 
In order to obtain a thorough perspective of public and official outlooks regarding 
Khrushchev’s visit to the US, and to determine the expectations and atmosphere at the 
time, the following paper seeks to examine the attitudes of both the American and 
Soviet people, as well as Khrushchev’s own views toward his trip to the United States 
in September 1959. By evaluating the American and Soviet perspectives during his 
visit, one can not only attain a comprehensive image of Khrushchev in the US and 
demonstrate that the Soviet Premier’s trip affected US-Soviet relations, but one can 
also achieve a clear image of the political and social climate of both the United States 
and the Soviet Union at the end of the 1950s. 
 
A Thawing in the Cold War? – Viorela Dana Papuc 
 
 56 
Introduction 
Nikita Khrushchev set off to America at a time when the world was involved in a 
most dangerous ideological conflict. Although the United States and the Soviet Union 
had been allies against Nazi Germany, with the end of World War Two, their 
relationship quickly disintegrated and descended into a Cold War that saw the globe 
divided into two hostile camps, with Soviet communism at one end and American 
democracy at the other. Under the guidance of their respective government officials, 
both the Soviet Union and the US claimed to ‘represent the aspiration of humanity; 
regarded the other as the devil’s disciple; and allowed no room for compromise with 
its rival’.iv Most frightening of all was that nuclear weapons were developed by both 
countries as a means of strategic superiority.v In consequence, the optimistic mood 
that followed World War Two changed dramatically into one that was marked with 
periods of intense distrust and anxiety. Specifically, the hostile atmosphere 
experienced as a result of the Cold War fundamentally affected Russian views of 
America and vice versa. Leaders and ordinary citizens from the two opposing states 
were frightfully aware and suspicious of each other. On one side, most Americans 
believed that Russia was a backward, yet aggressive, country oppressed by a one-
party dictatorship; on the other, many Russians viewed America as a greedy nation 
ruled by a privileged minority.vi At the time Khrushchev visited the United States, the 
Cold War was arguably in its most dangerous phase.  
 
Premier Khrushchev’s trip to the US certainly marked a new chapter in international 
relations. According to the Soviet press, his visit intended to create an atmosphere of 
‘good will’ and ‘mutual understanding’ based on his principle of ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ that did not see a war between capitalism and communism as 
inevitable.vii Unlike his predecessor Joseph Stalin, who up until his death in 1953 had 
prepared for military conflict with America, Premier Khrushchev was more interested 
in having an economic and political ‘competition’ with its rival rather than a war.viii 
Consequently, Khrushchev’s official intention for the visit was to build the US-Soviet 
relationship, and in doing so deflate the tense mood existing between the two 
superpowers and their respective allies. For the Soviet public, their Premier’s visit 
offered a glimpse at the nation that they had come to regard as their nemesis. Many 
Russians watched or read about Premier Khrushchev as he toured Washington, DC; 
spoke at the United Nations in New York; was cordially welcomed by San Francisco; 
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visited corn farms in Iowa; and discussed the future of the Soviet people with 
President Eisenhower at Camp David.ix Despite the propagandist nature of the Soviet 
news coverage received, most Russians were able to form a more detailed picture of 
their adversary. Likewise, the American people were able to familiarize themselves 
with the Soviet Union through its representative, Premier Khrushchev. They got at 
least some insights into the Soviet leader whose political ideology had affected their 
country so profoundly. Furthermore, American officials, while sceptical about the 
visit and its possible outcomes, looked forward to showing the head of the USSR 
their country and people.x Most significantly however, Americans and Russians alike 
were interested in the potential such a visit would have on curbing the Cold War 
tensions affecting their lives. Indeed, in a world plagued by the prospect of war, 
Premier Khrushchev’s visit to the USA offered the opportunity in establishing a 
mutual rapport between the American and Soviet leaders and their peoples. 
 
It should be mentioned that while numerous scholarly contributions have been 
dedicated to the Cold War and to US-Soviet relations, few concern themselves with 
Khrushchev’s visit to the USA, and even fewer examine both the American and 
Soviet views towards it.xi To some extent, the visit’s placement in the timeframe of 
the Cold War explains the lack of attention that it has received. Khrushchev’s 1959 
trip to America occurred between such significant events like Stalin’s death, his 1956 
denunciation by Khrushchev, the U-2 incident of 1960 and Cuban missile crisis of 
1962. Nevertheless, to wholly understand the general dynamics in US-Soviet relations 
and international affairs during the Cold War, one must look at Khrushchev’s visit 
through American and Russian eyes. Furthermore, since Khrushchev’s visit to the US 
generated a lot of media coverage in America as well as the Soviet Union, the present 
paper has greatly drawn upon articles prior, during and after Khrushchev’s visit that 
could be found in prominent American and Soviet newspapers and periodicals like 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, Moscow News, the Soviet New Times as 
well as the Current Digest of the Soviet Press.xii Such sources were employed as they 
best reflect the climate at the time and because they provide an insightful snapshot of 
attitudes expressed in both official and public opinion.  
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The American view 
At the time of Stalin’s death, the Western world was not familiar with Nikita 
Khrushchev. In fact, unlike the better known Soviet officials Vyacheslav Molotov, 
Georgi Malenkov and Lavrenty Beria, Khrushchev was largely an unknown figure 
outside the Soviet Union. The only limited public picture that he presented to foreign 
observers was anything but impressive. From all appearances he was ‘an impetuous, 
obtuse, rough-looking man, with something of the buffoon and a good deal of toss pot 
in him’.xiii Not until Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union in 1953 did the West pay more attention to him. Unlike Stalin, who 
had left Soviet Russia only twice while in power, Khrushchev gradually exposed 
himself to the world to become one of the most widely travelled and most-frequently 
met leaders of his time.xiv Westerners who saw him were impressed by his ‘shrewd 
native intelligence, agile mind, ambition and spontaneity’.xv They were also taken 
with his stance on deflating tensions between the Soviet Union and America. 
Khrushchev had ‘embarked on a more cooperative, less confronting foreign policy’ in 
which the USSR gave the impression that it was seeking to ‘peacefully coexist’ with 
the West, and particularly with the United States, by respecting and recognizing the 
other’s concerns and by being a ‘more flexible regime, one less menacing, less 
hostile, and more open to the outside world’.xvi Indeed, Khrushchev’s visit to the US 
was intended to further promote ‘peaceful coexistence’ and to create a safer, less 
threatening world.  
 
In the lead up to the Soviet Premier’s 15 September arrival, the American public 
showed mixed opinions regarding his impending tour of the United States. There 
were those like Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who were of the impression that 
Khrushchev really wanted to reduce tensions between the two countries.xvii Similarly, 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who acted as Eisenhower’s personal representative 
throughout the Premier’s visit, was of the belief that Khrushchev ‘wants peace and 
thinks that Russia needs peace in order to do what he wants to do’.xviii Such views 
could also be found in the American press. Before Khrushchev’s arrival in the US, a 
series of eight articles appeared in The New York Times authored by Harrison 
Salisbury enlightening the public on how Soviet Russia had changed for the better 
under Khrushchev’s leadership. In one article printed on 9 September 1959, 
Khrushchev was depicted as a liberal ruler, one that ‘likes to talk things over [and] 
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likes to hear what others have to say’.xix In another, Salisbury argued that ‘Mr. 
Khrushchev, unlike Stalin, was trying to run the Soviet Union without the 
employment of terror as a political weapon’ and that he was ‘making a sincere 
attempt’ at improving East-West relations.xx Salisbury’s articles resonated with the 
American public and many, while sceptical, were eager to get a first hand account of 
Premier Khrushchev and see for themselves whether he was genuine in his plan of a 
‘peaceful coexistence’ between the US and USSR. 
 
Nevertheless, while many Americans believed that a thaw in the Cold War could 
result from the impending visit, more were suspicious of the USSR’s willingness to 
improve the US-Soviet relationship. Indeed, the motives of the visit were thoroughly 
questioned. For example, prior to Khrushchev’s arrival, retired US Colonel Augustus 
Rudd wrote to The New York Times opposing Khrushchev’s visit and suggesting that 
Americans and the world should be alert for ‘there is real danger in regarding this 
visit as a simple gesture of goodwill’.xxi Colonel Rudd added that the Soviets had 
‘everything to gain and nothing to lose’ by the visit and that Americans must keep in 
mind that, as past actions showed, the communists wanted to take over the world by 
any means possible even if that meant visiting and sizing up its major Western 
antagonist’.xxii Such sentiments were felt by many Americans who regarded 
Khrushchev’s impending visit of ‘peace and friendship’ only as a pretext, not a genial 
attempt at curbing the Cold War danger. 
 
Some of the censure against the visit was also targeted at President Eisenhower. In an 
address before the Polish American Congress, Chicago Senator Paul Douglas 
criticized that the invitation to Khrushchev was ‘comparable to inviting Adolf Hitler 
to this country’ and while he did not want Khrushchev and his party to come to any 
harm, he did not see that the American public owed either him or President 
Eisenhower ‘anything more’.xxiii Similarly, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
viewed any attempts to negotiate with Khrushchev as futile. He felt that ‘Eisenhower 
was turning US foreign policy into a pageant of congeniality’ and that any talks 
would ‘come to nothing’.xxiv Clearly, the animosity towards the visit was so intense 
that criticism was not only aimed at Khrushchev but also at President Eisenhower. 
The general opinion in America toward Premier Khrushchev’s impending visit was 
not favourable in that while many were supportive of the trip, others were plainly set 
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against it. It seemed that most Americans were cautious lest they were misled or 
deceived into a false sense of security through the visit of Soviet Premier 
Khrushchev. 
 
President Eisenhower’s view of the visit 
Like the American public, President Eisenhower was sceptical of Khrushchev’s visit 
and whether anything substantial could result from it. Indeed, when it came to dealing 
with the Soviets, Eisenhower was greatly cynical of their agenda. Having been 
elected President in 1953 following a shift to the right in the public mood, 
Eisenhower regularly pledged to ‘win the Cold War’.xxv When he was re-elected in 
1956, Soviet officials viewed Eisenhower as significantly increasing the dangers of 
the Cold War.xxvi In return, he saw the Soviet Union as a threat to America and the 
free world. For instance, he regarded the Soviet ultimatum concerning the removal of 
the West from Berlin as a menacing threat that had the potential to intensify tensions 
between the Western world and the Soviet Union.xxvii Despite his mistrust of the 
USSR however, Eisenhower desired to see some improvements in US-Soviet 
relations before he left office in 1961 and as early as March 1959 had contemplated 
inviting the Soviet leader to the United States to discuss the Berlin situation.xxviii  
 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that Eisenhower’s eventual invitation to Premier 
Khrushchev to visit America had resulted from a misunderstanding. An invitation was 
only conditioned on whether concrete progress concerning issues such as Berlin were 
to have taken place between the foreign ministers of the US, Britain, France and the 
USSR at the May 1959 Geneva Convention and, at Eisenhower’s request, Under-
Secretary of State Robert Murphy was to have communicated that message to Soviet 
Deputy Premier Frol R. Kozlov.xxix Despite Eisenhower’s proposed invitation to 
Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier failed to keep his end of the bargain and have a 
productive Geneva Conference. More regrettably, as Eisenhower learned when 
Khrushchev accepted it on 21 July, Murphy had transmitted an ‘unqualified’ 
invitation through Kozlov.xxx The President, it seemed, had no choice but to go 
through with an unwanted meeting with an unwanted visitor. Since there had been no 
progress at Geneva to substantiate the invitation, Eisenhower focused the visit on 
attempting to discuss ‘nuclear tests, the wider aspects of disarmament, and the 
broadcasting of contacts between the United States and the USSR’.xxxi President 
A Thawing in the Cold War? – Viorela Dana Papuc 
 
 61 
Eisenhower stressed that while Premier Khrushchev was to have an ‘official’ visit, 
any talks between himself and the Soviet Premier would be informal negotiations of 
the basic problems between the West and the East.xxxii Although the unsavoury 
circumstances of the invitation had greatly ‘annoyed’ him, Eisenhower was 
‘determined to be courteous and correct’ while the Soviet Premier was touring 
America.xxxiii The President felt that at least an attempt had to be made in curbing the 
Cold War tensions experienced, even if that meant being cordial towards his 
adversary. 
 
Khrushchev in the USA 
When Soviet Premier Khrushchev arrived at Andrews Air Force Base several miles 
outside Washington DC, he was greeted by President Eisenhower and 200,000 
curious and excited Americans.xxxiv According to a police statement, the crowd was 
‘one of the largest for an out-of-towner’.xxxv Interestingly, out of the thousands 
present only a few who saw Premier Khrushchev were openly hostile to him. For 
example, while the Committee for National Mourning distributed around 1,000 black 
arm-bands among the crowd in objection to the visit, only a couple of them were 
reportedly seen along Khrushchev’s parade route.xxxvi Other protests against the visit 
included a cross of smoke a mile and a half long in the sky over Washington, special 
masses in all Catholic churches in the Washington area and special services in some 
Protestant churches.xxxvii Even so, there were few overt manifestations of antagonism. 
 
Many of those present were under the impression that the visit was of the most 
delicate nature and that ‘one wrong move could undo a thousand good ones’.xxxviii 
Consequently, as George Dixon of The Washington Post expressed, many ‘didn’t 
cheer too highly, they didn’t grovel too low’.xxxix Indeed, Americans were not eager 
to display too much. The reserved reception towards Khrushchev, according to 
reporter Lloyd Buchanan, was partially due to a banner that had been displayed along 
the line of march as Khrushchev arrived into Washington and that urged people to “be 
courteous but silent, not to cheer or applaud.”xl On the whole however, many of those 
present at Khrushchev’s arrival were eager to see the Premier. When asked by The 
Washington Post reporter Phil Casey why they were there, most people responded 
‘out of curiosity’, while others wanted ‘to be part of history’.xli Whatever their reason, 
Americans greeted Soviet Premier Khrushchev in a civil and subdued manner. 
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As in Washington, in New York Premier Khrushchev was greeted by a restrained 
reception marked by curiosity rather than disruptiveness or hostility. The police 
estimated that around 170,000 New Yorkers came out to see Khrushchev on just the 
first of his two-day stay there.xlii While the Premier met with some opposition, 
including cat-calls and boos from anti-red protestors, the public atmosphere in New 
York was relatively subdued. In fact, tensions regarding the visit were created by 
newsmen who wanted to get a reaction out of Khrushchev. During the Premier’s 
speech at the Economic Club of New York, Khrushchev was hassled when he 
avoided replying to a question about Soviet censorship, which provoked him to blurt: 
‘Surely you must show enough hospitality not to interrupt…if you don’t want to 
listen, all right!’xliii Apart from that disparaging incident, the general public was of the 
impression that Premier Khrushchev should be treated with the same respect he had 
shown to Vice President Richard Nixon and his delegation when they had visited 
Russia a few months earlier.xliv Following his address to the United Nations in New 
York, Khrushchev also gained support from Americans seeking peace. His proposal 
of ‘peaceful coexistence’ was viewed by some as a rational means of ceasing Cold 
War tensions. Many Americans were of the opinion that ‘however much they disliked 
communism and what it stood for, they had to live in a world in which it existed’ and 
snubbing Khrushchev would ‘not improve matters’.xlv Khrushchev’s trip around the 
US was therefore regraded as providing an unprecedented opportunity in building the 
broken relationship that existed between their country and the USSR. 
 
On 19 September, Khrushchev and his entourage left New York for Los Angeles. 
There, the Soviet Premier’s trip hit rock-bottom. To begin with, Premier Khrushchev 
was greatly angered by Los Angeles Mayor Norris Poulson’s cool reception. At the 
dinner given by the Mayor in honour of Khrushchev, Poulson, an anti-communist, 
mentioned in his introductory speech the Premier’s infamous phrase ‘We will bury 
you’ and warned him that, “You can’t bury us, Mr. Khrushchev, so don’t even try 
it…if challenged we shall fight to the death”, which greatly offended Khrushchev 
who retaliated: “It took me twelve hours to get here and it will take me ten and a half 
to get home”.xlvi The Premier’s threat to end his visit short was viewed by those 
present as ‘all too real’xlvii and if executed could have resulted in drastic 
consequences. Somewhat happily, Khrushchev later confessed to Ambassador Lodge 
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that Mayor Poulson had ‘tried to let a fart and instead shit in his pants’.xlviii The 
Premier’s ‘sweet and sour’ temperament challenged people’s perceptions of him. In 
fact, Ambassador Lodge, who until that incident had considered Khrushchev an astute 
and decent man, revealed to Eisenhower that the Premier had a most ‘vulgar’ 
personality.xlix Interestingly, his outbursts both bewildered and fascinated those 
present and those who heard about the incident via the extensive media coverage. It 
seemed that Khrushchev’s volatile, impulsive nature made him more accessible to the 
American people. While his uncomely public manners and his somewhat stocky 
comic figure often invited jokes from the American press, via the media coverage of 
his trip, Khrushchev engaged with millions of Americans as a ‘personality 
measurable in familiar terms’.l In fact, as the trip progressed, the attitudes reflected in 
the American press regarding the Soviet Premier and the USSR changed for the 
better. The initial reports of opposition and even contempt that appeared in both The 
New York Times and The Washington Post were replaced by reports of hope for better 
US-Soviet relations.  
 
Unlike Los Angeles, Khrushchev’s next stop in San Francisco was more enjoyable. 
There, Khrushchev was welcomed with ‘the most enthusiastic cheers of his American 
visit’.li Over ten thousand people crowded the streets when he arrived and cheered so 
warmly that Khrushchev broke away from his security guard and rushed towards the 
crowd, waving his hands around and shouting ‘spasibo’.lii When questioned about the 
apparent cordiality of the reception, members of the crowd said that they had heard 
that Khrushchev had gotten ‘a rough deal in Los Angeles’ and had turned out ‘to 
show him traditional American hospitality’.liii Some San Francisco residents also 
mentioned that their welcome had been motivated by ‘a spirit of fair play’, adding 
that after all the Soviet Premier was a guest to their country.liv The friendly welcome 
Khrushchev experienced in San Francisco made up for the poor performance in Los 
Angeles. Most Americans, it seemed, with the progression of the Premier’s trip, 
became principally focused on getting Khrushchev to learn more than expected about 
their country and their customs and by so doing they hoped that he would see the 
importance in improving the strained US-Soviet relationship. 
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Khrushchev at Camp David 
In the last leg of the Premier’s trip, President Eisenhower took his visitor to his retreat 
at Camp David where they had informal talks concerning some of the pressing 
matters facing their countries and the world. While no ‘breakthrough’ negotiations 
were accomplished by the talks, Khrushchev did remove the time limit within which 
he had threatened to sign a Soviet-East German peace treaty forcing the Western 
powers out of Berlin.lv In return, Eisenhower agreed to attend a summit conference, 
which Khrushchev was eager to have, and settled in reciprocating Khrushchev’s visit 
with his own trip to Russia.lvi Among the other issues discussed were the expanding 
of information between the East and the West and the overall improvement in US-
Soviet relations.lvii However, the talks at Camp David were not without frustrations. 
According to US General A.J. Goodpaster, the President had been irritated by 
Khrushchev’s unacceptable decisions concerning Berlin and at one point even 
threatened that he would ‘not return the visit to Russia’ or attend a summit if some 
progressive understanding was not achieved.lviii While still sceptical on whether or 
not the visit had actually helped US-Soviet relations, Eisenhower, like many 
Americans, felt that the trip had generated a thawing in the Cold War. In particular, 
the lifting of the USSR’s Berlin time limit, as Eisenhower suggested, somewhat 
relaxed the atmosphere of crisis and opened the way for further negotiations between 
the US and the USSR’.lix  
 
Aside from the diplomatic development that had resulted from the visit, a most 
valuable part of Khrushchev’s thirteen-day trip was that Americans got to see the 
Soviet Premier first hand. Prior to his visit, Khrushchev, like his predecessor Stalin, 
had been regarded by the American public as ‘the epitome of evil’.lx After his visit 
however, Khrushchev was no longer viewed as personifying the sinister force of 
communism. In fact, he seemed to be just ‘a grandfatherly, round, short man’.lxi His 
wife and children, who had accompanied him on his trip, had further helped soften 
Khrushchev’s image. The very act that he had brought his family along made 
Khrushchev more accessible and appealing to the general public. A nation-wide 
Gallup Poll surveying the public’s reaction to the visit found that when asked the 
question: ‘All things considered, do you think Khrushchev’s visit to the United States 
had been a good thing or a bad thing?’ the ratio of approval to disapproval was 3-to-
1.lxii Furthermore, in regard to Eisenhower’s expected trip to Russia, the majority of 
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the general public expected the President’s reception would be ‘friendlier’ than that 
experienced by Khrushchev.lxiii So, while initially sceptical about the visit, in many 
ways Khrushchev’s trip to the US was viewed as a success by the American public. 
The hopeful feelings associated with the visit were greatly intensified by seeing the 
Soviet leader in their county and by the diplomatic headway made at Camp David. 
Indeed, on the whole, Americans were left hopeful that his visit had brought about a 
promising tone in the US-Soviet dialogue. 
 
The Soviet view 
For the USSR, Premier Khrushchev’s visit ushered in a new stage in US-Soviet 
relations; one that was significantly different from the mistrust propagated during the 
Stalinist era. Indeed, even before his trip to the US, Nikita Khrushchev had embarked 
on a more flexible and realistic foreign policy, one that improved the unfavourable 
and distorted image of America within the USSR. Khrushchev’s revised strategy 
toward the West took several forms that entailed a substantial increase in the 
importation of Western books, exhibitions and newsreels, the temporary cessation in 
the jamming of some Western broadcasts, and a greater exchange of foreign 
delegations and tourists.lxiv Under the ‘peaceful coexistence’ strategy he implemented, 
Khrushchev certainly altered the view of the world for the average Soviet citizen. 
With an increase in foreign contacts, the US became less feared and better 
understood.lxv That is not to say that the legacy of the Stalinist past, with its 
suspicions and one-sided truths, was no longer present. Indeed, it should be 
emphasised that throughout Khrushchev’s time in power, anti-American propaganda 
changed direction on several occasions. At times, Soviet foreign policy moved toward 
dangerous confrontations with the West, at others it moved toward establishing a 
thawing in the Cold War.lxvi Consequently, on the one hand America was still 
regarded as a nation ruled by a minority of ‘right-winged extremists and Pentagon 
militants’; on the other, there was a conception that the majority of ‘real’ Americans 
were ‘fine people’.lxvii Thus, despite a steady increase in US-Soviet contacts, the 
general Soviet view of the United States in early 1959 more or less remained as 
before, mainly influenced by a mixture of stereotypes and misconceptions. 
 
Regardless of their preconceived views of America, the Soviet people looked forward 
to Khrushchev’s impending visit to the US. When they were told of their Premier’s 
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invitation to America at a press conference on 5 August 1959, thousands voiced their 
support by sending their best wishes through letters and telegrams.lxviii In fact, the 
hopes and expectations that the Soviet people associated with Khrushchev’s visit 
were extensively expressed throughout the Soviet press. E.A. Moiseyev, a biologist 
from Leningrad, wrote to the Soviet New Times revealing that ‘the exchange of visits 
between the leaders of our two countries is a heartening and long-awaited 
development’ that would be ‘an advantage to all’.lxix Similarly, Vladimir Matskevich, 
USSR’s Minister of Agriculture, hoped that the visit ‘would facilitate [both] peaceful 
co-operation…and the extension of scientific, cultural and agricultural contacts 
between the two countries’.lxx Indeed, according to a somewhat overzealous New 
Times article, ‘no one in the Soviet Union, either individual or group, [had] any 
interest in preventing closer understanding and closer confidence between Moscow 
and Washington’lxxi as a means of ending the Cold War. From factories, villages and 
universities, ‘thousands [of] good wishes’ had been received concerning the Soviet 
leader’s ‘mission of good will’.lxxii Prior to Khrushchev’s trip to the US, there was 
certainly an apparent excitement in the air, a hopeful atmosphere mingled with 
apprehension. It seemed that the Russian people sincerely wished to see practical 
steps being taken in building the hostile relationship that existed between their 
country and the US. For many Russians the visit was looked upon as being a 
favourable reflection of their country, their leader and themselves. Naturally, many 
wanted it to succeed. They wanted to show America and the world that the Soviet 
Union was a mighty peace-promoting nation that aspired to reduce international 
tensions. 
 
A substantial support toward the visit was largely directed at Premier Khrushchev. As 
implied in Face to Face with America, a Soviet sponsored book documenting the 
Premier’s visit, it was ‘the Soviet Union, the Soviet people with all its heroic 
deeds−its space rockets and its atomic power stations, its new factories and its 
agricultural achievements−that flew to America in the person of Khrushchev’.lxxiii So, 
while the Soviet people were greatly enthused at the prospects of a successful visit, 
they were especially approving of their Premier for embarking upon his historic trip. 
They were of the belief, or at least that was how it was expressed throughout the 
Soviet press at the time, that Khrushchev had done a noble service for them and for 
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communism. The Soviet Premier was looked upon by many Russians as a leading 
statesman set on ‘enhance[ing] the prestige of [their] socialist homeland’lxxiv and 
achieving a new stage in relations between the worlds’ mightiest powers. According 
to The Washington Post, ‘a flood of praises flowed into the Kremlin, newspaper 
offices and radio stations for Premier Khrushchev’.lxxv Academician K. Skyyabin 
wrote to Moscow News claiming that the ‘Soviet people, welcome with joy the 
meeting between N.S. Khrushchev, this most active chairman of peace, and President 
Eisenhower’.lxxvi Similarly, E. Bordashov, a Soviet engineer, stressed that ‘the 
international atmosphere has become warmer [because] we know N.S. Khrushchev to 
be an ardent and consistent champion of peace and man’s happiness’.lxxvii For the 
Soviet people, Khrushchev’s visit to America emphasised that his policy of a 
‘peaceful coexistence’ between the US and the Soviet Union was being implemented 
and therefore his trip benefited the USSR as well as the world.  
 
Khrushchev’s impending visit to the United States certainly occupied a firm place in 
Soviet life. After so many years of censorship, Russians were eager to finally find out 
more about their adversary. Unfortunately, despite their enthusiasm, most of the 
coverage they received concerning the US and its people was limited. Unlike their 
American counterparts, the Soviet people were provided, on the whole, with an air 
brushed version of Khrushchev’s visit to the United States. Although around thirty 
Soviet correspondents accompanied Premier Khrushchev to the US, their dispatches 
lacked in information and often duplicated one another.lxxviii Instead of covering all 
the news related to Khrushchev’s tour of the United States, the Soviet press was set 
on censoring any positive impressions of America that had the potential to disfavour 
the Soviet government. Interestingly, the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
reported that although not devoid of criticism, compared with previous media 
coverage, Soviet radio commentary on the United States, at least at the beginning of 
Khrushchev’s visit, had been generally ‘light and sweet in tone and substance’.lxxix 
Even so, such relaxations were temporary. By the end of Khrushchev’s visit, the 
Soviet government were not only jamming some of the special announcements made 
by Khrushchev himself, but they were highly selective in what they aired of President 
Eisenhower’s speeches.lxxx It seemed that while Khrushchev frequently professed his 
encouragement of East-West contacts, the Soviet press continued to hold information 
from its public. In other words, the Stalinist totalitarian control remained, and 
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anything provocative was usually overlooked. In true communist style, the state-
controlled Soviet press primarily focused on the more favourable aspects of 
Khrushchev’s trip, thus greatly limiting the Soviet people’s view of his visit and 
America and consequently limiting a genuine attempt at achieving a thawing in the 
Cold War. 
 
Furthermore, a great portion of the news coverage received in the USSR was mostly 
focused on the enthusiastic receptions Americans showed the Premier and how he, in 
turn, was able to demonstrate to the US public that the Soviet communists about 
whom they had been told so many ‘incredible’ stories were normal people like 
themselves. For instance, Khrushchev’s visit was portrayed in the USSR as giving a 
‘crushing blow to anti-Soviet propaganda and misconceptions’ and, in that respect, it 
was ‘doubly and triply useful by drawing a vivid and convincing picture of the Soviet 
Union’.lxxxi Instead of enlightening the Russian public on America and subsequently 
dispelling misconceptions about the US, the Soviet press was more concerned with 
chronicling Khrushchev’s personal successes. As a result of the one-sided nature of 
the media, the Soviet people were made to believe that not only was their Premier 
wholly ‘embraced by the US public’, but that his visit was ‘shaping up to be a 
massive success’.lxxxii To be fair, some news coverage revealed that Khrushchev was 
met with hostility from ‘unnamed circles’, but such reports were quick to dismiss that 
any opposition was in the minority.lxxxiii For instance, the Disneyland ‘incident’ that 
saw an upset Khrushchev being refused entry to the theme-park due to security 
reasons was skimmed over and reported as a ‘ludicrous incident’, that was ‘not worth 
mentioning’.lxxxiv As a result, the Soviet people were, on the most part, kept from 
getting a real idea of Khrushchev’s visit and the American way of life, which greatly 
restricted the sincerity of establishing an interchange between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. 
 
The news coverage that the Russian people received about the US during 
Khrushchev’s visit was a vivid example of a government that still misinformed its 
public. Despite Khrushchev’s ‘attempt’ at expanding contacts with the US, the lack 
and distortion of information distributed by the state-controlled Soviet press was well 
calculated to assure the Russian people that ‘they were better off than the “alleged 
victims of capitalism”’.lxxxv Any opposition that Premier Khrushchev encountered 
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throughout his visit and that the Soviet press reported, was attributed to the ‘serious 
illness of America politicians, which Mr. Khrushchev was doing his best to 
“cure”’.lxxxvi Overall, as previously mentioned, the Soviet press did not dwell on any 
cool receptions that Khrushchev received. Indeed, the Russian people were made to 
believe that ‘Khrushchev’s visit had rocked America’.lxxxvii The Khrushchev-
Eisenhower talks at Camp David were especially portrayed by the Soviet press as a 
stepping stone toward peace and disarmament and therefore ‘a better life, ever so 
much faster’.lxxxviii If anything went wrong, it was suggested, it would not be the 
doing of the Soviet government, but ‘the businessmen and profiteers of armaments’, 
who would ‘stand in the way of peace despite the equally hopeful dreams of 
American workers’.lxxxix Referring to the Camp David talks, the Soviet people were 
said to have been ‘gratified to learn that this exchange of views took place’, and that 
on all the issues discussed ‘there was a common understanding of improving Soviet-
American relations’.xc 
 
Despite the limited information made available to the Soviet people, or because of it, 
the majority of Russians were of the opinion that their Premier’s trip had been a great 
success. Like their American counterparts, they too believed that the visit signified 
‘the consolidation of the peace and security of peoples.’xci For the Soviet populace, 
the very act that Khrushchev had gone to America indicated a softening in US-Soviet 
affairs and a win for the USSR. According to the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 
the warm reception accorded to their Premier in the US was enough ‘graphic 
evidence that there [was] no unsurmountable obstacles to the establishment of good-
neighbour relations between the two greatest powers of the world’.xcii At a meeting 
held upon his return at the Lenin Central Stadium in honour of the Premier’s visit to 
the US, V. Ustinov, First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the Communist 
Party, captured the general Soviet mood by saying that the “people are justly proud 
that they and their homeland [had] an outstanding role to play in the great fight for 
peace”.xciii For the Soviet people, a new favourable stage in US-Soviet relations, as 
well as a new phase in the USSR’s history, had been achieved by Premier 
Khrushchev’s visit to America.  
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Khrushchev’s view 
Given the hostile world that the USSR found itself in following Stalin’s death, Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev sought to improve the tense East-West relationship and 
alter the unfavourable image of the Soviet Union abroad. In fact, Khrushchev, 
considered as the main ‘de-Stalinizer,’ took several measures in detangling the Soviet 
Union ‘from the international isolation that Stalin’s heavy handed tactics had 
created’.xciv Although the USSR’s foreign policy manifested more flexible tactics than 
under Stalin’s rigid leadership, it would be a mistake to think that Nikita Khrushchev 
was ‘soft’ on the West. On the contrary, while he may have been seeking America’s 
cooperation, Khrushchev retained Stalin’s mistrust toward the US and still regarded 
America as the Soviet Union’s main rival. Despite his suspicion of America, or rather 
because of it, Premier Khrushchev had been fascinated with the United States for 
some time before his eventual visit in September 1959. The Soviet leader was most 
taken with the US because he regarded it as the ‘strongest opponent among the 
capitalist countries; the leader that called the tune of anti-Sovietism for the rest’.xcv 
Khrushchev’s courtship of the West intensified with his appointment as Premier of 
the USSR and his pursuit of an American invitation can be dated back to the mid-
1950s. It was during an interview with Western journalists on 13 May 1957, that 
Khrushchev first hinted that he wanted to see the United States: ‘I cannot go as a 
tourist’, but a meeting with Eisenhower concerning summit-level talks on issues 
facing their countries would be useful as ‘I greatly respect President Eisenhower and I 
have told this to him personally’.xcvi While his various subtle attempts at securing an 
invitation were not answered for some time, by early August 1959, due in part to the 
unstable situation facing the world, Khrushchev was asked to visit the US. 
 
When Khrushchev received the invitation he had been wanting, he was stunned. As 
he remembered it, Eisenhower’s request had ‘come out of the blue’, making him find 
it ‘hard to believe’.xcvii His son Sergei Khrushchev recalled that despite the shock his 
father was feeling, the Soviet leader also received the news of his impending visit 
‘with immense satisfaction…even with joy’.xcviii For Premier Khrushchev, the 
invitation was a personal achievement. Being the first head of the Soviet government 
to travel to America was certainly appealing. To describe Khrushchev as proud and 
overzealous would probably be an understatement. For some time Khrushchev had 
wanted to step out of the shadows of his more famous predecessors and such a visit 
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certainly provided the needed coverage and prominence in boosting his public figure 
at home as well as abroad.xcix Furthermore, Premier Khrushchev took the invitation as 
a sign that the US had finally acknowledged Soviet Russia as an equal.c The Premier 
also believed that ‘public opinion in the United Sates had begun more and more to 
favour an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union … [and] which Eisenhower 
was forced to listen to’.ci Whatever his reasoning for the invitation, Khrushchev 
certainly looked forward to his impending visit and what that entailed for him 
personally as well as for his country. 
 
Nevertheless, while he was more than excited to finally be going to the US, 
Khrushchev was also apprehensive about the trip. To begin with, due to his general 
mistrust of America and the tense relationship that existed between the US and the 
Soviet Union, Khrushchev was most afraid that he would be not be given the 
privilege and respect befitting his visit. According to the Premier, ‘there was some 
concern that we might encounter discrimination…that our reception might not 
correspond to the requirements of protocol in keeping our rank’.cii The Soviet leader 
also feared that American ‘capitalists and aristocrats’ viewed him, a former worker, 
as ‘a poor relation’ coming to beg.ciii Consequently, Khrushchev was greatly worried 
about the planned negotiations he was to have with Eisenhower. While he wanted to 
‘go beyond minimal peaceful coexistence’ and to resolve more pressing matters like 
nuclear disarmament, he was determined on refusing ‘anyone that push[ed] us around 
or sat on our necks’.civ Even so, despite his anxieties concerning the developments 
that could ensue from his visit, the Soviet Premier was perhaps most eager to finally 
‘be face to face with America…[so] I’d be able to see it with my own eyes, to touch it 
with my own fingers’.cv 
 
While he may have been overly impressed by the welcome he received upon his 
arrival in Washington, in that it made him ‘immensely proud’ and ‘dispelled [the] 
apprehension’ he had had toward the visit,cvi Khrushchev retained his suspicions of 
any opposition he encountered. Throughout his tour of the US, Khrushchev felt that 
any hostility directed towards him came primarily from arrogant government officials 
and signified that America was not willing to curb the Cold War tensions. Premier 
Khrushchev thought that prominent figures like Under-Secretary of State Douglas 
Dillon and even the American Secretary of State, Christian Herter, were rather cold 
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toward him and his entourage and, because of their anti-Communist stance, set out to 
sabotage his trip. According to Khrushchev, the former was ‘very hostile’ and 
‘couldn’t stand us’, while the latter ‘wasn’t much better than [Dean] Acheson’, the 
former Secretary of State who was an avid anti-red protestor.cvii As mentioned earlier, 
an official that Khrushchev did not warm to during his visit was LA Mayor Norris 
Poulson. In fact, Khrushchev’s tense meeting with Poulson was a most notable part of 
his trip, one that the Premier remembered well. According to the Soviet leader, the 
Mayor held an ‘extremely anti-Soviet position…that [Khrushchev] had no intention 
of tolerating’,cviii particularly if that interfered with his ‘mission of good will.’ After 
Poulson ‘stuck all kinds of pins in the Soviet Union and [its] system’, Khrushchev 
later reflected that ‘it was always the representatives of certain political circles, and 
not the American people themselves, who expressed the hostility that existed between 
our country systems’.cix  
 
Aside from a few hostile encounters usually involving government officials, the 
Soviet Premier was of the opinion that the American public, on the whole, was 
genuinely supportive of his peace promoting visit. For example, as Khrushchev 
remembered, wherever he went ‘whole families were out to greet him’ and ‘there 
were no angry shouts’.cx It should be pointed out that from the onset of his trip 
Khrushchev set out to gain the support of the American people. Indeed, the decision 
to take the whole Khrushchev family to the US was influenced by the possibility that 
it would generate a favourable impression of the Soviet Union and its leader among 
the general public. Furthermore, throughout his trip, Khrushchev tried to reduce 
American misconceptions of the USSR and attempted to dispel any suspicions 
towards him by making an effort to meet the people. At any opportunity, he mingled 
with ordinary Americans and tried to win them over with his charismatic character. 
When he did receive attention, he was greatly flattered and believed that the public 
took a liking to him and to the ‘peaceful coexistence’ he was preaching.cxi While 
Khrushchev was met with some criticism, for the greater part of his visit he was too 
sheltered and too preoccupied with being in America to fully attain a realistic 
perspective of the public’s attitude towards him. Nevertheless, he left the US thinking 
‘that the plain people of American liked [him]’.cxii  
 
A Thawing in the Cold War? – Viorela Dana Papuc 
 
 73 
On 25 September, two days before departing, Premier Khrushchev finally got his 
chance to talk to President Eisenhower when he joined him at Camp David. Although 
Khrushchev recalled in his memoir that he had no high hopes of resolving the more 
serious problems facing their countries, according to historian William Tompson, the 
Soviet Premier had gone to Camp David ‘expecting some dramatic results’.cxiii It 
would certainly be fair to imply that Khrushchev had gone to America confident that 
US-Soviet relations, not merely communications, but trade, cultural exchanges and 
everything else that went with it, were going to expand. Khrushchev wanted to come 
away from the visit and the talks in a way that allowed him ‘to pass into history as a 
man who secured a long-term détente in the cold war, a lengthy period of peace for 
the development of his people’s economy and well-being’.cxiv After some 
deliberations and suspicions on both parts, Khrushchev and Eisenhower issued a joint 
communiqué, which, according to the Soviet Premier, would be received favourably 
by all in the world ‘who were working for peace’.cxv Despite the negotiations at Camp 
David, no concrete problems facing the US and the Soviet Union were resolved. 
However, just the fact that his visit had occurred and that a summit for further talks 
had been scheduled was something that Khrushchev was most proud of and that ‘even 
Stalin [would] have been interested in’.cxvi 
 
Following his visit to the US, Premier Khrushchev was full of optimism ‘that his 
personal diplomacy could bear fruit’.cxvii Indeed, it goes without saying that aside 
from the diplomatic headway made at Camp David, Khrushchev had been part of a 
historic event. He himself was quite aware that the Soviet Union had taken necessary 
steps in deflating the Cold War. More importantly, Premier Khrushchev believed that 
he had altered the biased American perceptions of himself and Soviet Russia, and that 
he had gained the support of the American masses. Although he claimed that the visit 
had not changed his own perceptions of capitalist America, his speech given in 
Moscow the day of his arrival revealed that not only did he firmly believe a thawing 
in the Cold War had occurred, but that President Eisenhower was willing to cooperate 
with the USSR.cxviii So sure was Khrushchev of the success of his American trip that 
during his visit to Peiping, China less than forty-eight hours after leaving the US, he 
told his hosts wholeheartedly that his trip ‘will undoubtedly improve relations 
between the US and the Soviet Union and ease international tensions’.cxix 
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Epilogue 
The visit to the USA of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev can be regarded as 
representing a thawing in the Cold War and subsequently an improvement in US-
Soviet relations. Indeed, regardless of past mutual suspicions of each other, in 
general, the Soviet and American public alike welcomed Khrushchev’s visit, 
believing that it had marked a promising turn in the hostile international arena. The 
Camp David talks and the subsequent scheduling of a summit between the US and the 
Soviet Union and their allies were especially regarded as bringing the two countries 
closer together at a most dangerous time in world history. Khrushchev’s trip certainly 
set the tone for international peace, which was eagerly desired by both the 
populations of the US and the USSR. The visit paved the way toward ending the Cold 
War and removing the war danger by replacing it with hopes of peace and agreement 
between the world’s two opposing superpowers. Premier Khrushchev was also of the 
opinion that his visit signified the beginning of a gradual increase in contacts and 
peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the 
visit, according to the Soviet New Times, ‘in the Soviet-American dialogue, you 
[could] hear notes of mutual trust, respect and even cordiality’.cxx 
 
Despite the hopes and prospects that both the American and Soviet public as well as 
Khrushchev associated with his trip, just six months after his promising mission of 
‘peace and friendship,’ US-Soviet relations received a devastating setback when on 1 
May 1960, only weeks before the scheduled East-West summit in Paris, an American 
U-2 spy plane was shot down in Soviet territory.cxxi The confidence, optimism and 
trust acquired from the visit diminished. As a result, the promising dialogue that had 
been fostered during the trip was wiped away, essentially burning the bridges toward 
improved US-Soviet relations and the warming of the Cold War. The U-2 incident 
radically affected the psychological mindset of both the American and the Soviet 
public. As Sergei Khrushchev noted, ‘everything was back in its familiar [order] and 
newspapers were filled with harsh calls for vigilance and readiness to rebuff the 
aggressor’.cxxii  
 
Even so, the U-2 incident and the setback that it had on the development of East-West 
relations should not take away from the historic significance of Khrushchev’s visit to 
the US. While any political achievements may have faded into the background, the 
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Soviet Premier’s trip to the United States enabled the American and Soviet public to 
better acquaint themselves with each other. As Sergei Khrushchev suggested, the 
Soviet Premier’s visit was a ‘successful first attempt’ at making the Americans and 
the Russians move away from viewing each other as ‘the enemy’.cxxiii For that matter, 
the visit improved the unfavourable Russian views of America and vice versa that had 
been a symptom of the Cold War, and allowed the United States and the USSR as 
well as the world to breathe easier. If only for a short period of time, Premier 
Khrushchev’s visit to the US certainly relaxed the international climate and brought 
the American and Soviet people closer together, a feat that had not been achieved at 
any other time throughout the Cold War and that eventually boded well for the future.  
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